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Abstract— This paper applies to Italian milk supply chain 
a theoretically grounded methodology able to detect for 
the presence of market power along the supply chain itself 
using easily available data. The model, developed by Lloyd 
et al. brings to estimate a quasi-reduced form equation in 
which consumer price is regressed against producer price, 
marketing costs and demand and supply shifters. When 
market power is exerted along the supply chain both of the 
shifters are statistically significant and signed accordingly 
to model prescriptions, while with perfect competition 
none of the shifters is significant. 
29 time series have been used in the analysis, within 
three different dataset covering partially or totally 
overlapped time periods. Variables having the same order 
of integration have been used within an Error Correction 
Model framework. Among all the variables having one 
cointegrating vector, only those with statistically 
significant parameters and signed according to model 
prescriptions have brought to conclusive results, detecting 
market power exertion along the Italian milk supply chain 
during two over the three periods examined. The present 
methodology may be useful in competition policy analysis 
as a preliminary “fast” test on food supply chain conduct. 
For this purpose theoretical model validation is however 
necessary using Monte Carlo simulations. In this line, 
further improvements relates to explicitly modeling food 
processing-retailing relationships in order to detect for 
market power on each segment of the supply chain. 
Keywords— market power, cointegration, supply chain. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Food industry and food retailing have witnessed a 
continuous process of concentration in many European 
countries over the last decades [1]; such phenomenon 
has raised concerns among public authorities and 
governments for potential anti-competitive behaviors 
along food supply chains. Such deeds are represented, 
among others, by oligopoly and oligopsony power, that 
may be exerted within agrifood systems at food 
processing and retailing stages to the detriment of 
farmers (supplier of raw agricultural inputs) and 
consumers [2][3]. For these reasons a vast amount of 
researches have been carried out by agricultural (and 
non-agricultural) economists to analyse anti-competitive 
behaviors in agrifood markets using different 
methodological approaches that can be roughly 
classified into two broad categories: Price Transmission 
Asymmetry (PTA) studies and New Empirical Industrial 
Organization (NEIO) models. 
Following the suggestion provided by Digal [4] on 
market power analysis in food retailing, the aim of this 
paper is to identify and apply a methodology able to put 
together advantages of aforementioned approaches in 
order to test conclusively for the exertion of market 
power along the whole food supply chain using easily 
available data. What seem the more appropriate 
theoretical background for this purpose has been started 
by McCorriston [5] [6] and then developed and adapted 
by Lloyd [7] [8] [9] for empirical application to some 
food supply chains in UK. The present work applies 
such methodology to Italian fluid milk supply chain, in 
so doing a threefold contribution is provided with 
respect to the existing literature. Firstly, starting from 
the available approaches for analyzing imperfect 
competition in agrifood systems, the importance and 
usefulness of the employed methodology is explicitly 
highlighted. Secondly, to the best knowledge of the 
writer, this is the first empirical application of the 
McCorrsiton-Lloyd approach in another Western 
European country. Lastly, a slightly different 
interpretation of the inter-face between theoretical 
model and empirical application is adopted and 
consequent suggestions for testing its validity and to 
extend and improve its adoption are made. 
The paper is organized as follows: chapter II provide 
a brief treatment of existing methodologies for the 
analysis of imperfect competition in food chains, putting 
in evidence their strength and weaknesses in order to 
justify the choice of the adopted theoretical model. 
Section III describe the McCorrsiton-Lloyd approach,   3 
representing the reference framework for the empirical 
analysis, while in chapter IV the dataset construction 
and time series stationarity tests are illustrated. Section 
V show the econometric strategy employed in the 
empirical analysis and consequent results. Section VI 
draws main conclusion and provides suggestions for 
future researches.  
II. LITERATURE REVIEW  
This chapter is meant to give a brief illustration of 
principal approaches adopted to examine the presence 
and the extent of imperfect competition at different 
levels of analysis. In continuity with previous studies 
[4], the main objective is to highlight advantages and 
disadvantages in each group of methodologies rather 
than giving an exhaustive review of the relevant 
literature. The end of the chapter summarizes and 
compare the focal features of each approach, pointing 
out and proposing the McCorriston-Lloyd model [5] [6] 
[7] as a unifying framework to examine market power 
along food chains. Subchapter A rely heavily on the 
survey of Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel [10] while 
subchapter B takes as reference point the book of Perloff 
[12]. 
A. Price transmission asymmetry studies 
Economic theory recognize in the price mechanism a 
key role for carrying signals among economic agents 
about relative scarcity of goods and factors in a certain 
market, in order to assure an efficient resources 
allocation. It is also of paramount importance that price 
signals were correctly transmitted among markets 
related horizontally (same good or factor in different 
places or countries) and vertically (a good in a market is 
a factor in the subsequent one). An incorrect or 
incomplete transmission of prices along vertically 
related markets may rise a double concern, both for 
academics and consumers. On one hand imperfect price 
transmission may represent an inconsistency for 
economic theory [10], as shown by the exhaustive 
empirical work carried out by Peltzman [11] while, on 
the other side, it is often considered as an evidence of 
anti-competitive behavior. For this reason, a remarkable 
amount of work have been done on this topic, with 
particular reference to vertically related markets such as 
food supply chains. 
The main part of these studies try to identify 
asymmetries between input (farm) and output 
(consumer) prices movements along vertically related 
markets; In this context there is asymmetry when input 
price increase (decrease) is fully passed on to output 
price while a decline (rise) in the former is transmitted 
incompletely to the latter. Asymmetries can be classified 
according to the nature of incomplete transmission [10] 
(incompleteness in rapidity or size of price adjustment) 
and to the direction of asymmetry [11]. According to the 
second criterion, there is positive PTA when (assuming 
a causality from input to output prices) food price adjust 
incompletely to farm price increase (positive variation) 
than to their fall. In the reverse case, negative PTA takes 
place when the imperfect transmission from input to 
output price pertain only farm price decrease (negative 
variation). Considering the marketing margin [13] [14] 
as the difference between output and input prices, and 
taking into account that exogenous shocks may reverse 
the causality pricing so far assumed (flowing from farm 
to food price), a more general and appropriate definition 
would be that positive PTA allows for a complete 
transmission of margin-reducing price movements, 
while negative PTA happens when margin-stretching 
price signals are fully passed through the marketing 
chain [10].  
What is more important, for competition policy 
purposes, is to establish unambiguously what causes 
ATP in vertical marketing chains; in spite of the vast 
amount of work done on the topic, different 
determinants are suggested by many authors, without a 
unique reference framework able to unify contrasting 
explanations [10] [15]. Market power exertion in one or 
more intermediate stages of food marketing chain is 
pointed out to be a cause of ATP [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] 
to the detriment of suppliers of raw agricultural product 
and food consumers. However the causal relationship 
between imperfect competition and ATP is not 
theoretically grounded [4] [10] [15] [20] [21]. 
According to Meyer [10] testing such kind of 
relationship is not easily feasible as it would require a 
meta-analysis using evidence from previous studies on 
different supply chains in different countries in order to 
catch the treatment effect of imperfect competition on 
price transmission. Anyway lack of homogeneity among 
econometric techniques employed in each empirical 
research would make data and results incomparable. The 
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only empirical work that overcome such limitation is by 
Peltzmann [11] that analyzed price transmission in a 
wide range of vertically related markets using the same 
econometric methodology; however market power 
exertion in each vertical chain has been proxyed using a 
market concentration index (Hirschman-Herfindal) to 
gather cross-sectional evidence on the effect of 
imperfect competition on PTA. Such approach rely on 
the Structure-Conduct-Performance paradigm that has 
been criticized since it assumes a one way relationship 
from structure to performance not taking into account 
simultaneity bias and endogeneity of market structure 
[10] [22] [23] [24]. It seems, once again, that causation 
of APT by imperfect competition are not reliably 
testable. On the theoretical side, Gardner [13] developed 
a a farm-retail supply chain equilibrium displacement 
model, assuming perfect competition in intermediate 
stage and constant return to scale; its model indicates an 
higher effect of food demand compared to farm supply 
shifter on the marketing margin. Using numerical 
simulations based on the same model, Kinnukan and 
Forker [16] found that elasticity of price transmission 
differs according to the side of shift, suggesting that this 
could lead to PTA. This would mean that PTA can take 
place without imperfect competition in intermediate 
stages of supply chain, even if von Cramon [25] 
suggests that in this context PTA would only be 
apparent. Following the Gardner framework, 
McCorriston has shown that imperfect competition can 
reduce price transmission elasticity, but different 
conditions in elasticity of substitution [5] and return to 
scale [6] may either amplify or offset the market power 
effect. This implies that if processing and retailing 
markets are imperfectly competitive but show high 
elasticity of substitution and increasing return to scale 
such technology and cost conditions can compensate the 
market power effect yielding symmetric price 
transmission along the marketing chain. In this case the 
presence of PTA would not be a viable tool for detecting 
market power exertion along food chains. 
In addition to aforesaid criticisms against the market 
power-PTA hypothesis, other causes of asymmetric 
adjustment of price movements are found in the 
literature, like menu-repricing costs [11] [26] [27] [28], 
[29] inventory costs [30] (especially at retail level), 
inflation [31] [32] and policy intervention on farm prices 
[16]. Even if part of these causes may lead to short run 
PTA, that would be harmless for social welfare, [10] rise 
the idea that imperfect competition cannot be the only 
determinant of PTA. 
To summarize what reported so far, PTA approach 
presents the advantage of using easily available data on 
farm and consumer price movements to examine and get 
insights on the dynamics of the whole food supply 
chain. In so doing all the vertically related stages  within 
the marketing (farming, processing, wholesaling and 
retailing) chain are analyzed. However, for a number of 
theoretical and empirical reasons, the presence of PTA 
cannot represent a conclusive evidence of market power 
exertion in one or more stages of the marketing chain 
being analyzed.  
B. New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) 
structural models 
Such broad category of models was born as a 
consequence of the dissatisfaction with the Structure-
Conduct Performance paradigm [24]. NEIO models are 
aimed to test for the presence or to estimate the extent of 
market power exertion at market level. To do that it is 
often adopt a conjectural variation approach, setting a 
simultaneous equation system (demand and profit 
function) to estimate the extent of oligopoly or 
oligopsony represented by a conduct parameter [12]. 
Since NEIO models are grounded on economic theory 
their findings of market power are more conclusive and 
reliable than those of PTA studies [4] [12] [20]; 
However they are demanding in term of data 
(qualitatively and quantitatively) and econometric 
sophistication while their estimation are focused and 
confined to a single market rather than to the entire food 
supply chain.  
 
The two groups of models (PTA and NEIO) share in 
some way the same objective - test or estimate market 
power exertion, even if PTA are not conclusive- but 
operates at different levels, using different kinds of data, 
carrying out different findings; in order to make the 
detection on market power exertion in agrifood systems 
more effective for competition policies purposes, it 
would be desirable to integrate such approaches [4]. As 
previously said, such objective would require a 
methodology that unifies advantages and fix limitations 
of PTA and NEIO models in order to test conclusively  
for the exertion of market power along the whole food 
supply chain. The research for such kind of 
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methodology starts from the first model describing 
explicitly the functioning of a vertical related supply 
chain (by Gardner [13]) even if assuming perfect 
competition in the intermediate stage. McCorriston 
adapted the model, allowing for market power exertion 
within the marketing chain, variable elasticity of 
substitution [5] and non constant return to scale [6] in 
order to derive the elasticity of price transmission under 
different conditions. Lloyd [7][8][9] built on such 
framework deriving (and applying) a theoretical model 
able to detect for market power exertion along the food 
chain. Such contribution are not unique, in fact also 
Holloway [33], following Wohlgenant [34] modify 
Gardner model relaxing the assumption of perfectly 
competitive behaviour to test the effect on the farm-
retail price spread (an then to check for market power 
exertion). Both Lloyd and Holloway use conduct 
parameters to allow for imperfect competition along the 
food chain, but only the latter consider new firms 
entrance explicitly. However the approach proposed by 
Holloway is more demanding in term of data for the 
empirical application, as it require time series of prices 
and quantities (of  raw agricultural products) , while the 
McCorriston-Lloyd model needs time series of prices 
(or price indexes) supplemented by other easily 
available data (proxyes of marketing costs, demand and 
supply shifters). For a matter of data requirement the 
McCorriston-Lloyd approach [7][8][9] is more 
appropriate to detect for the presence of market power 
along food supply chains in Italy. 
III. THEORETICAL MODEL  
The theoretical model [7][8][9] used for the analysis 
can be considered as a modification of the Gardner [13] 
equilibrium displacement model; while Gardner 
considered the effect of various shifters (farm input 
supply and food retail demand) on the farm-retail price 
spread, assuming perfectly competitive markets, the 
framework presented here [7][8][9] relaxes such 
assumption and allows for imperfect competition along 
the food chain introducing two conduct parameters 
(ranging from 0 to 1) of oligopoly and oligopsony 
power. In so doing, a reduced for equation is derived in 
order to test for the presence of (and not to measure the 
extent) imperfect competition along the food chain; the 
variables included in such equation differs according the 
values of conduct parameters. While Gardner models 
explicitly the behavior of food processing sector (even 
in a perfectly competitive fashion), this framework put 
emphasis on the retail stage of the food chain as a higli 
probable source of market power. This represent 
obviously a restriction and limitation for a more general 
application of the model, as it does not account 
explicitly for anticompetitive behavior of the processing 
stage (food industry).For a matter of simplicity, in this 
paper the intermediate stage of food chain will be 
considered as an aggregate of food processing and 
retailing sectors. 
The modeled food marketing faces, on the consumer 
side, an inverse demand function: 
) , ( N P D x x       (1) 
Where x is the quantity of food product sold, Px is 
consumer price, and N is an exogenous food demand 
shifter. At the beginning of the chain, raw agricultural 
product is sold according to a supply function: 
) , ( W a h Pa       (2) 
Where Pa is farm-gate price of raw agricultural 
product, a is the quantity sold and W is an exogenous 
shifter of farm supply function. As previously 
mentioned, the intermediate food processing and 
retailing stage is seen as the most probable source of 
market power and then its behaviour is explicitly 
modelled using a profit function of the i-th firm:  
) ( ) ( ) ( i i i a i x i x C a a P x x P        (3) 
Where  i  , xi and ai are, respectively, profit, quantity 
of food sold and quantity of raw agricultural product 
bought by the i-th firm and Ci are costs not associated to 
agricultural product. Furthermore for this stage of food 
chain, constant return to scale and fixed proportion 







        ( 4 )  
Where   is an input-output coefficient that equals 
one. Such assumption impose a limitation to the 
empirical application of the model. The profit 
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In order to get an explicit solution from (5) under 
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previous assumptions, agricultural supply (2) and food 
demand (1) function are made linear as follows: 
cN bP D x x           (6) 
gS h Pa          (7) 
In which S is the food product supplied in a country, 
that is in turn composed by: 
W x S i         ( 8 )  
With the exogenous shifter W that appear in (2) is the 
level of exports. Using (6) – (8) the profit maximising 
conditions (5) can be rewrote allowing for oligopoly and 
oligopsony power exertion by the intermediate stage of 
the food chain: 
gx P M x
b
P a x 

   
    (9) 
With    and   representing respectively oligopoly 
and oligopsony conduct parameters ranging from 0 
(perfect competition) to 1 (monopoly – monopsony 
behaviour), the former represents the behaviour of the 
processing-retailing stage in the in the product (food) 
market, while the latter embodies its conduct in buying 
(raw agricultural) factor. When the food supply chain is 
perfectly competitive both of parameters equal 0, while 
departure from such benchmark are associated to 
increasing values, till 1. Assuming n firms operating in 
the processing-retailing stage, both of parameters can be 
identified by average conjectural elasticities. The 
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Even if such parameters are widely used in the NEIO 
conjectural variations literature to estimate the extent of 
imperfect competition, in this context they are used only 
as instruments to signal collusive behaviour.  
The variable M, that appears in equation (9), 
represents all the non-agricultural costs that determine 
the extent of marketing margin (Px-Pa). M then contains 
both fix and variable components: 
zE y M         ( 1 2 )  
Where y is a fix cost component and zE represents 
variable costs associated to non-agricultural inputs (Eg. 
Labour costs in processing and retailing). The set of 
previous equations (6) (7) (9) and (12) is employed to 
represent endogenous variables in explicit form: 
 
) 1 ( ) 1 (
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    

bg
bgW bzE cN bh by D
x
     (13) 
 
   
) 1 ( ) 1 (




          

bg




       





        
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(15) 
By subtracting equation (14) from equation (15) and 
rearranging it is possible to make explicit the marketing 
margin (Px-Pa): 
) 1 ( ) 1 (







        
 
bg
gW h bg cN g
b
zE y bg g
b
D
P P a x
(16) 
Note that if the intermediate stage of supply chain 
does not exert neither oligopolistic ( =0) nor 
oligopsonistic power ( =0), equation (16) collapse in a 
simpler form representing marketing margin under 
perfect competition: 
M zE y P P a x             (17) 
According to the findings of the model, two important 
considerations can be made; first, under perfect 
competition along the food chain, price spread (Px-Pa) is 
represented only by marketing costs (M) and, second, it 
does not depend on shifts in farm supply (W) and 
consumer demand (N) functions. However if oligopoly 
or oligopsony power is exerted along the food chain (i.e. 
 or    differ from zero) both of the exogenous shifters 
(W and N) affect the magnitude of price spread. In 
particular, under anticompetitive behavior, a shift in 
consumer demand (N) increase the margin while a shift 
in farm supply (W) reduce it. Note that if market power 
is exerted within the food chain, both of the shifters 
affect the margin simultaneously. The effect of 
exogenous shifter on the marketing margin is then 
“activated” by oligopoly or oligopsony exertion by 
intermediate stage of the chain; imperfect competition in 
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one of the two related markets (agricultural input supply 
and food demand) to make the shifter to affect the 
spread. 
To make a bridge from theoretical model (16)and its 
empirical implementation, it is used an unrestricted 
equation (comprising exogenous variables W and N) to 
test the (null) hypothesis of perfect competition against 
the alternative one of market power exertion: 
W N M y P P a x 4 3 2 1 0              (18) 
Under perfect competition along the food chain 
( = =0) none of the shifters affect the margin and 
then associated parameters are expected to be not 
significantly different to zero. Perfect competition, then, 
can be tested as follows: 
0 : 4 3 0     H      ( 1 9 )  
Note that while accepting the null we can 
conclude that the supply chain is perfectly 
competitive, rejecting it is not a sufficient condition 
to deduce market power exertion (even if in 
conventional hypothesis testing this would be the 
case). To reach such conclusion some additional 
conditions are required; firstly, both of the 
parameters have to be significantly different from 
zero ( 3  ≠0; 4  ≠0) and, secondly, the parameter of 
exogenous shifter N has to be positive ( 3  >0) 
while the parameter of W has to be negative 
( 4  <0). The alternative hypothesis to be accepted 
in order to conclude that market power is exerted 
along the food chain is then the following: 
0 ; 0 : 4 3 1     H      ( 2 0 )  
In the writer interpretation (that differs slightly from 
the version of Authors that developed and implemented 
the model), only empirical results falling under H0 
(perfect competition)or H1(oligopoly and/or oligopsony 
power) can be considered plausible and conclusive. 
Alternative hypotheses (only one of the shifter 
significant and/or not signed according model 
prescriptions) would yield ambiguous and inconclusive 
results. 
IV. DATASET AND TIME SERIES TESTS 
The supply chain that has been detected for market 
power exertion is the Italian fluid milk sector; such 
choice has been partly determined by model restriction 
(input-output coefficient equal to one) and data 
availability. The first subchapter describes the dataset, 
while the second one treat test carried out on each time 
series. 
A. Dataset description 
To apply the theoretical model 29 time series have been 
employed, within three different dataset (called 
respectively A, B and AB) covering partially or totally 
overlapped time periods (1996.1 – 2003.10 for database 
A; 2000.1 – 2008.10 for database B ; 1996.1 – 2008.10 
for database AB) using monthly data from publicly 
available databases: Istat, Conistat, Coeweb and Ismea. 
All the data are in index form (1995=100, 2000 =100) 
and refer to retail milk price, producer milk price (even 
proxyed by producer animal price and producer import 
milk price indexes), index of wages in dairy processing 
(as a proxy of marketing costs), retail price indexes all 
good, food, food and alcoholic beverages (as a proxy for 
demand shifter) and farm input price index (as a proxy 
for farm supply shifter). Variables’ name, abbreviation, 
source and manipulations are reported in Table 1.  
Some concerns may be raised for using producer and 
retail price indexes from different statistical sources 
(Istat and Ismea respectively) or in approximating 
producer price by index of a broader category (animal 
products). Unfortunately, available data do not allow for 
having producers and retail price indexes homogeneous 
both for statistical source and for level of aggregation; 
In order to exploit all the available statistical 
information, where possible, the original time series 
have been lengthened by re-basing the missing period of 
the same series having another basis. Such operation has 
been performed extending time series having both of the 
base indexes (1995=100 and 200=100) using one or 
more overlapping period between two series of the same 
variable (For instance producer milk price based on 
1995 and 2000). In particular it has been chosen to 
maximize the number of re-based series, where possible, 
in order to increase the probability of finding a 
combination of variables fitting both model requirement 
(see end of previous chapter) and the restrictions 
imposed by the econometric estimation strategy (see 
next chapter about Error Correction Model). Obviously 
the extensive use of rebased time series allows, on one 
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hand, to examine a longer period, but on the other side 
may rise concerns about the impact of data 
manipulations on the reliability of empirical results. In 
other words, re-based time series contain non-genuine
Table 1 variable used and data sources for the Italian milk supply chain 
Variable Abbrev  Data  description Source  Base    Period  Elaborations 
Retail Milk price  RM1  Consumer Price Index:  milk  Istat  1995  96.1 - 09.3  genuine data 
Produc. Milk Price  PMA  Producer Price Index: cow milk  Ismea  1995  95.1 - 03.10  genuine data 
Produc. Milk Price  PMB  Producer Price Index: cow milk  Ismea  2000  00.1 - 09.2  genuine data 
Produc. Milk Price  PM1A  Producer Price Index: cow milk - rebased   Ismea  1995  95.1 - 09.2  rebas 00.1-03.10 
Produc. Milk Price  PM2A  Producer Price Index: cow milk - rebased   Ismea  1995  95.1 - 09.2  rebas 00.1-00.12 
Produc. Milk Price  PM3A  Producer Price Index: cow milk - rebased   Ismea  1995  95.1 - 09.2  rebas 01.1-01.12 
Produc. Milk Price  PM4A  Producer Price Index: cow milk - rebased   Ismea  1995  95.1 - 09.2  rebas 02.1-02.12 
Produc. Milk Price  PM5A  Producer Price Index: cow milk - rebased   Ismea  1995  95.1 - 09.2  rebas 03.1- 03.10 
Produc. Milk Price  PM1B  Producer Price Index: cow milk - rebased   Ismea  2000  95.1 - 09.2  rebas 00.1-03.10 
Produc. Milk Price  PM2B  Producer Price Index: cow milk - rebased   Ismea  2000  95.1 - 09.2  rebas 00.1-00.12 
Produc. Milk Price  PM3B  Producer Price Index: cow milk - rebased   Ismea  2000  95.1 - 09.2  rebas 01.1-01.12 
Produc. Milk Price  PM4B  Producer Price Index: cow milk - rebased   Ismea  2000  95.1 - 09.2  rebas 02.1-02.12 
Produc. Milk Price  PM5B  Producer Price Index: cow milk - rebased   Ismea  2000  95.1 - 09.2  rebas 03.1-03.10 
Produc. Anim Price  PAPA  Producer price Index: animal products  Istat  1995  95.1-04.12 genuine  data 
Produc. Anim Price  PAP1A  Produc. Pric. Ind.: animal products - rebas   Istat  1995 95.1-08.12  rebas  04.1-04.12 
Produc. Anim Price  PAPB  Producer price Index - animal products  Istat  2000 00.1-08.12  genuine  data 
Produc. Anim Price  PAP1B  Produc. price Index: anim products, rebas   Istat  2000 95.1-08.12  rebas  04.1-04.12 
Import Produc. Milk  IPMA  Index of milk import price from EU 25  Coeweb  1995  93.1 - 09.3  Indexed price €/kg 
Import Produc. Milk  IPMB  Index of milk import price from EU 25  Coeweb  2000  93.1 - 09.3  Indexed price €/kg 
Marketing Shifter  MA  Index of wages, dairy processing sector  Conistat  1995  96.1 - 02.12  genuine data 
Marketing Shifter  MB  Index of wages,  dairy processing sector  Conistat  2000  96.1 - 08.12  genuine data 
Marketing Shifter  MA1  Index of wages, dairy processing sector  Conistat  1995  96.1 - 08.12  rebas 98.1-98.12 
Demand Shifter  DS1  Consumer Price Index: general index   Istat  1995  96.1 - 09.03  genuine data 
Demand Shifter  DS2  Consumer Price Ind: general index-no tobacco  Istat  1995  96.1 - 09.3  genuine data 
Demand Shifter  DS3  Consumer Price Index: food, wines and spirits  Istat  1995  96.1 - 09.3  genuine data 
Supply Shifter  SS1  producer price index for dairy farms  Ismea  1998  94.1 - 08.10  Correc techn progr
Supply Shifter  SS2  producer price index for dairy farms  Ismea  1995  94.1 - 08.10  Correc techn progr
Supply Shifter  SS3  producer price index for dairy farms  Ismea  1995  94.1 - 06.1  genuine data 
Supply Shifter  SS4  producer price index for dairy farms  Ismea  2000  00.1 - 08.10  genuine data 
information (at least in their re-based parts). To balance 
between such points it has been followed the strategy of 
separating the variables in two “genuine” datasets (A 
and B) containing mainly not re-based variables, 
confining re-based time series in another (longer) 
dataset (AB). In this line, re-based variables are denoted 
by the last letter that indicates their base (A for 1995 and 
B for 2000), preceded by a number indicating the 
overlapping period used for the re-basement (from 1 to 
5), while “genuine” (not-rebased time series) are 
denoted only by the letter that identifies their basis. 
Demand and supply shifter variables are an exception to 
aforementioned rules. Dataset A contains the variables: 
RM1, PMA, PAPA, IPMA, MA, MB, MA1 DS1, DS2, 
DS3, SS1,SS2 and SS3. Dataset B contains the 
variables: RM1, PMB, PAPB, IPMB, MA, MB, DS1, 
DS2, DS3, SS1, SS2, SS4. Dataset AB contains the 
variables: RM1, PM1A, PM2A, PM3A, PM4A, PM5A, 
PM1B, PM2B, PM3B, PM4B, PM5B, PAP1A, PAP1B, 
IPMA, IPMB, MB, MA1, DS1,DS2,DS3, SS1 and SS2. 
B. Time series stationarity tests 
The use of time series for the empirical analysis 
requires to perform some preliminary tests about their 
properties; equation (18), cannot be estimated using 
OLS unless all the time series employed enjoy a 
property called stationarity [15] [35] [36] that is, having 
constant statistical properties (mean, variance and 
covariance). According to Granger [37], running an 
OLS with non-stationary variables leads to unreliable 
estimates, resulting in spurious regression. A stationary 
variable, is said to be integrated of order zero, I(0); A 
nonstationary variable contains one or more unit roots;   9 
when a nonstationary variable became stationary after 
differencing (subtracting by each value the previous one 
is said to contain a unit root, or to be  integrated of order 
one, I(1). So, the test for market power exertion using 
OLS require that all the time series used are stationary in 
level, if such condition would not satisfied, other 
estimation procedures can be followed, provided that all 
the variables employed are I(1). Following such kind of 
requirements, all the time series in each dataset have 
been tested for stationarity in level and in firs difference 
to find their order of integration. Econometric package 
EViews 6 has been used for stationarity tests and for 
subsequent empirical estimation. Stationarity has been 
tested using Augmented Dickey-Fuller test, ADF [38] 
and Phillips-Perron test, PP[39] that takes 
nonstationarity (presence of a unit root) as a null 
hypothesis against the alternative one of stationarity. In 
order to complete the testing framework, variables in 
level and first difference have also been tested using 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test, KPSS, [40] 
that assumes stationarity as a null against nonstationarity 
as alternative hypothesis. In each test has been assumed 
an underlying data generating process of the variable 
having, respectively, intercept and tend and intercept 
only. Judgments about order of integration of each 
variable have been drawn comparing t statistics (for 
ADF), adjusted t statistics (for PP) and Langrange 
Multiplier statistics (for KPSS) with critical values for 
each distribution (at 1%, 5% and 10%). For ADF an PP 
tests, estimation output provided also probabilities of 
unit roots. As results can differ among tests and can be 
sensible to functional form specification (intercept with 
or without trend) it has been chosen to consider 
stationary in level those variable having low probability 
(p<5%) of accepting the null hypothesis in at least one 
specification of ADF and PP tests and, at the same time, 
a probability bigger than 5% of accepting the null in 
both of the KPSS test specifications. Stationarity tests 
have been performed separately on the 3 datasets, as 
results could change according time series length. 
According to the stated criteria, all the variable in 
dataset A are nonstationary in level (except for Import 
milk price IPMA) and stationary in first difference, 
dataset B has all the variables I(1) in level and I(0) in 
first difference, while dataset AB shows all variables 
with a unit root in level (except for IPMA and IPMB) 
and stationary in first difference. In complex, with the 
exception of import price index variables in datasets A 
and AB, all the time series result to be I(1) in level and 
I(0) in first difference. This means that OLS estimation 
is not a viable tool to perform the market power test, 
however as almost all variables have the same order of 
integration, I(1), another econometric strategy can be 
followed to detect for imperfect competition along the 
fluid milk chain. 
V. ECONOMETRIC ANALISIS AND RESULTS 
A. Econometric analysis 
Giving the nonstationarity of time series, estimation 
strategies other than simple linear regression have to 
be used in order to avoid spurious results. According to 
the Engle-Granger representation theorem [41], if a set 
of nonstationary variables share the same order of 
integration, then can exist a variable, made by their 
difference or linear combination, that is stationary. If 
such condition holds, then the variables are said to be  
cointegrated and then they share a long run relationship, 
while difference among them are short term errors. 
When some variables are cointegrated, an Error 
Correction Model (ECM) can be estimated, establishing 
a relation between changes in one variable of the set (for 
our purposes the dependent variable) with respect to 
long run equilibrium with the other variables in the set. 
The ECM splits such changes (errors) in a short run 
component, that causes departure from long run 
equilibrium, and a long run component, called Error 
Correction Term (ECT) that brings the system back to 
the equilibrium. The ECM allows, then, to estimate 
separately long run and short run relationships among 
nonstationary cointegrated variables, providing that such 
relationships are not spurious and statistically 
significant. The cointegrating vector is the set of 
parameters estimates associated to long run component 
(ECT).  
To estimate consistently equation (18) in the light of 
aforesaid econometric theory, for each dataset all the 
variables have been combined, looking for those 
combination having one and only one cointegrating 
vector according to Johansen cointegration test. EViews 
provides automatic selection of lags for this test, under 
five different assumptions about functional form of data 
and cointegration equation (CE): 
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1.  No trend in data, no intercept and trend in CE 
2.  No trend in data, intercept and no trend in CE 
3.  Linear trend in data, no intercept and trend in CE 
4.  Linear trend in data, intercept and trend in CE 
5.  Quadratic trend in data, intercept and trend in CE 
Those combinations of variables showing one and 
only one cointegrating vector, under one or more 
previously mentioned assumptions, have been tested for 
estimating an ECM. In so doing, all the necessary 
restrictions (number of lags for each variable and 
functional form) have been adopted for each selected 
combination of variables in order to assure one 
cointegrating vector only. 
Of course such combinations of variables do satisfy 
only econometric conditions for consistent estimation of 
long run relationships among variable; in addition to this 
also theoretical requirements about significance and sign 
of parameters estimates have to be fulfilled. 
B. Results 
Before showing the econometric results of ECM 
estimation, it is useful recall the necessary conditions 
that parameter  estimates of each variable should satisfy, 
according to economic theory and model prescriptions, 
in order to test conclusively about competitive behavior 
along the food chain: 
  According to economic theory producer price and 
marketing costs parameters should be always 
positive and significantly different from zero 
( 1  >0; 2  >0); 
  To infer perfect competition along the food chain, 
supply and demand shifter parameters have to be 
simultaneously not significantly different from zero 
( 3  = 4  =0) 
  To infer market power exertion along the food 
chain, demand shifter parameter has to be 
positive and significantly different from zero 
while, simultaneously, supply shifter parameter 
has to be negative and significantly different 
from zero ( 3  >0; 4  <0). 
Such conditions have to be fulfilled in order to get 
unambiguous conclusions in performing market power 
test, and will be then compared with sign and 
significance of the explanatory variables parameters 
estimates in the cointegrating vector. Such parameters 
describe the long run equilibrium relationships between 
dependent variable (retail milk price) and each 
explanatory variable in the theoretical model; According 
to econometric theory, the Error Correction Model used 
provides consistent and non spurious estimations of such 
relationships. Among all the combination of I(1) 
variables showing one cointegrating vector, will be 
presented, where possible, those having parameters 
statistically significant and signed according to model 
prescriptions, or at least those nearest to such 
requirements. 
As the interest of the empirical estimation is mainly on 
sign and significance of parameters estimates (and not 
on their magnitude) t statistics only will be shown in 
the tables. For an algebraic matter, t values of 
explanatory variables have been multiplied by -1 to 
transform the cointegrating vector in equation (18), 
normalizing with respect to the dependent variable. In 
the following tables functional form of data and 
cointegration equation chosen for each combination of 
variables have been omitted, so different t values for the 
same combination are due to different functional forms. 
Table 2 reports estimation results for dataset A (1996.1-
2003.10) in which all the combinations presented are 
consistent with economic theory, indicating that 
consumer price is linked by a significantly positive 
relation to producer price and marketing costs (any other 
result would be meaningless, in the long run). Food 
demand shifter parameter is not significantly different 
from zero in the first four combinations, while is 
significantly negative in the last one, failing to satisfy  
model prescriptions. Farm supply shifter is always 
negative and significant, suggesting market power 
exertion during the period considered, however this is 
not sufficient to reach such conclusion as the same 
coherence is simultaneously needed for both of the 
shifters parameters.  
International EAAE-SYAL Seminar – Spatial Dynamics in Agri-food Systems    11 
Table 2 Dataset A, ECM cointegrating vectors parameters [t 
values] normalized respect to retail price (91 observations, 2 
lags in variables). Different values for the same combination 





Demand shifters  Supply shifters 
PMA    MB  DS   SS2  SS3 
Expected signs with market power exertion 
> 0  > 0  > 0  < 0 
Expected signs with perfect competition 
> 0  > 0  not signif. ≠0 not  signif.  ≠0 
[4,915]  [4,524]  DS2  [0,811]     [ -3,55]  - 
[5,166] [4,655] DS1  [0,268]  [  -3,511] - 
[4,476] [4,530] DS2  [0,108]  [  -3,411] - 
[5,03] [4,69]  DS1  [0,060]  [  -3,494] - 
[4,039]  [3,697]  DS3  [ -2,27]  -  [ -3,31]
t distribution critical values  with 87 degree of freedom 
1% 2,371  5% 1,663  10% 1,2915 
Given the available data, for the period covered by 
dataset A, the test fails to detect any form of imperfect 
competition along the fluid milk supply chain. Note that 
this does not indicate prefect competition of the 
marketing chain in the same period, as relative 
requirements (not significant effects of both of the 
shifters on consumer price) are not achieved. In other 
words empirical results does not provide any clear 
evidence about the conduct (perfect or imperfect 
competition) in the food chain analyzed. 
Table 3 shows parameter estimates t values for dataset B 
(2000.1 – 2008.10). It is worth remembering that 
apparently identical combination of variables differs for  
assumptions on data and cointegrating vector functional 
form (unreported in the table). In the first four 
combinations producer price is proxyed by import milk 
price; in such cases all the parameters are highly 
significant (at 1%) and signed as suggested by economic 
theory and theoretical model, detecting market power 
exertion along the supply chain during the examined 
period. Similar indications came from the last five 
combinations of variables using Ismea producer milk 
price index (PMA) and Istat producer animal price index 
(PAPB)  as proxy. In the regression including PMA all 
parameters are significant at 1% except for MA1 
(marketing costs) with 2,5% of significance. 
Regressions with PAPB show still significant and “well 
signed” parameters, even if marketing costs significance 
falls at 5%. 
Table 3  Dataset B, ECM cointegrating vectors parameters [t 
values] normalized respect to retail price  (101 observations, 4 
lags in variables). Different values for the same combination 
of variables depends on different assumptions 





     MA1   MB  DS3   SS2   SS4  
Expected signs with market power exertion 
> 0  > 0  > 0  < 0 
Expected signs with perfect competition 
> 0  > 0  not sign. 
≠0 
non signif. ≠0 
IPMB [7,540] [4,39]   [5,422] [-6,90]  
IPMB [7,514]   [4,35] [5,342]  [-6,88]  
IPMB [7,540] [3,45]   [5,644] [-7,11]  
IPMB [7,497]   [3,43] [5,612]  [-7,09]  
PMB [3,423] [2,14]   [14,657]    [-5,64]
PAPB [3,128]   [1,92] [11,671]    [-5,81]
PAPB [3,081] [1,91]   [11,701]    [-5,77]
PAPB [2,997]   [1,88] [11,457]    [-5,70]
PAPB [2,947] [1,86]   [11,481]    [-5,66]
t distribution critical values with 97  degree of freedom  
1% 2,366 5% 1,661  10%  1,2905 
In complex four over nine presented combination 
indicate with no doubt (1% significance) that over the 
period 2000.1 – 2008.10 the Italian fluid milk supply 
chain has been imperfectly competitive in one or more 
of their vertically related markets. The theoretical model 
adopted it is however unable to identify at what level, on 
which side (demand or supply) and to what extent 
market power have been exerted. 
Table 4 reports cointegrating vectors t values obtained 
from dataset AB (1996.1 – 2008.10) that has been built 
up using longer time series obtained by re-basement of 
original ones. The first unexpected result is shown in the 
first four rows of the table, having, as a proxy of 
producer price, import price index for milk variables 
(IPMA and IPMB). ECM estimation using such 
variables yield the best results in term of sign and 
significance of long run parameter estimates, indicating 
then market power exertion. 
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Table 4 Dataset AB ECM cointegrating vectors parameters [t 
values] normalized respect to retail price  (149 observations, 4 
lags in variables). Different values for the same combination 
of variables depends on different assumptions 






   MB*  DS3 SS2* 
Expected signs with market power exertion 
  > 0  > 0  > 0  < 0 
Expected signs with perfect competition 
  > 0  > 0  not signif. ≠0 not  signif.  ≠0
IPMA [7,474] [5,477]  [5,897]  [  -6,670]
IPMA [7,440] [5,399]  [5,706]  [  -6,589]
IPMB [7,474] [5,477]  [5,897]  [  -6,676]
IPMB [7,439] [5,399]  [5,706]  [  -6,589]
PAP1A [4,636]  [3,708]  [8,301]  [  -4,878]
PAP1B [4,313]  [3,635]  [7,958]  [  -4,553]
PM3A [1,597]  [1,149]  [15,56]  [  -1,889]
PM4A [1,464]  [0,934]  [15,47]  [  -1,750]
PM2A [1,435]  [0,890]  [15,45]  [  -1,720]
PM5A [1,340]  [0,743]  [15,38]  [  -1,620]
t distribution critical values, more than 120 df 
1% 2,326    5% 1,645 
2,5% 1,960    10% 1,282 
* MA1 and SS1 show the same t values 
However, such variables had to be excluded from the set 
of time series used for empirical estimation, since they 
resulted stationary in level and in first difference, I(0), 
according to three different tests (ADF, PP and KPSS). 
Following relevant econometric theory, a cointegrating 
relationship can be searched only among series sharing 
the same order of integration and then results obtained 
using stationary variables may be spurious. Note that the 
same shorter and not-rebased variables employed in 
dataset A and B are I(1) and it is then plausible to infer 
some kind of modification in time series patterns 
induced by re-basement procedures. In any case, ECM 
estimations containing IPMA and IPMB are probably 
spurious and conclusions on market power detection 
based on them cannot be consider reliable.  
Among the other I(1) variables, however, there are 
combinations providing conclusive results, according to 
model prescriptions. The two cointegrating vectors 
having PAP1A and PAP1B (index of animal product 
prices) as a proxy of producer price, yield parameters 
estimates fulfilling necessary conditions for presence of 
imperfect competition along the food chain. All the 
other combinations, having PM2A, PM3A PM4A 
PM5A for producer price, have marketing costs 
parameters not significantly different from zero. As such 
result is not plausible on the economic theory ground, no 
clear conclusions can be drawn from those combinations 
of variables. In complex only two cointegrating vectors 
have parameters estimates consistent, in sign and 
significance, with the evidence of anticompetitive 
behaviour at some stages of fluid milk supply chain 
during the period 1996.1 – 2008.10.  
To sum up, empirical analysis detected market power 
exertion along the Italian fluid milk supply chain during 
two over the three periods examined (2000.1 – 2008.10 
and 1996.1 – 2008.10). The strategy of using more time 
series as proxyes of each variable has been necessary to 
assure enough combination of variables having the same 
order of integration, one cointegrating vector and 
parameters estimates with sign and significance in line 
with theoretical model prescription.  
VI. CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This paper has tried to give an empirical contribution 
to competition analysis along food supply chains, 
applying a theoretical framework that yields conclusive 
results on market power exertion using easily available 
data. For this reason, such approach can be used as a 
“first pass” test [9] to check for the presence of 
imperfect competition along the supply chain, before 
applying more complex and data requiring methods to 
measure the extent of market power in each vertically 
related market. Such combination and integration of 
methods can represent a useful tool for improving 
competition policy analysis efficiency [4]. In this 
context, empirical and theoretical issues emerged during 
the processing of the present work may provide useful 
hints and suggestions for improvement and future 
research. 
The imperfect competition test pointed out the 
exercise of market power at some stage of the Italian 
fluid milk supply chain over the period 1996-2008, 
while no conclusive indications can be drawn for the 
period 1996-2003. Note that the absence of clear 
evidence of market power does not imply perfect 
competition, as in this case both demand and supply 
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shifters should not affect the retail price. 
A crucial point pertain the validation of the 
theoretical model employed in the analysis, indeed all 
the possible empirical outcomes (presence/absence of 
market power or inconclusive results) cannot confute or 
confirm the validity of underlying theoretical framework 
because of the lack of counterfactual evidence. There 
are two ways to get such evidence: analyzing each stage 
(market) of the supply chain using structural models, or 
setting up a Monte Carlo simulation experiments. The 
first way would be highly data demanding and 
counterfactual evidence would be confined to the supply 
chain analyzed, while the second one would give more 
general results (even if it is quite complex to set up) as it 
allows to simulate different kind of vertically related 
markets on which perform the market power test. The 
latter approach is the same used to validate some NEIO 
models [42] [43]. Once tested in its validity, the 
framework may be further improved by modelling 
explicitly and separately processing and retailing stages 
and, if possible, their complex relationships. Such model 
refinement would allow to look for the source of market 
power along two separate segments of the supply chain: 
from farm to food processing and from food processing 
to food retailing. 
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